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LITIGATING BRADY v: MARYLAND:
GAMES PROSECUTORS PLAY
Bennett L. Gershmant

INTRODUCTION

By any measure, Brady v. Maryland' has not lived up to its
expectations. Brady's announcement of a constitutional duty on
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants embodies,
more powerfully than any other constitutional rule, the core of the
prosecutor's ethical duty to seek justice rather than victory.z
Nevertheless, prosecutors over the years have not accorded Brady the
respect it deserves. Prosecutors have violated its principles so often
that it stands more as a landmark to prosecutorial indifference and
abuse than a hallmark of justice. Moreover, as interpreted by the
judiciary, Brady actually invites prosecutors to bend, if not break, the
rules,' and many prosecutors have become adept at Brady
gamesmanship to avoid compliance.'
Professor of Law, Pace School of Law.
, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2 Brady held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." [d. at 87. The Court observed:
t

"Society wins not only when the guilty are· convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our
system orthe administration ofjustice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." ld Brady's
constitutional due process standard has been incorporated into an explicit ethical duty upon
government attorneys. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]; MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (2004) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]; ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
Standard 3-3.11(.) (1992) [herein.fter ABA STANDARDS].
3 See Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the
Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 833, 836
(1997) (Brady "is a right that almost begs to be violated"); Eugene Cenuti, Through the Looking
Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some New Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due
Process, 94 Ky. L.J. 211, 274 (2005) ("Brady is now best understood as a rule ofprosecutorial
privilege rather than a rule of disclosure.''). I am reminded of Judge Jerome Frank's famous
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To be sure, U.S. litigation tolerates a certain amount of
gamesmanship-especially in civil litigation~where there exists a
semblance of adversarial equality and where attorneys representing
private clients are bound by rules of ethics to serve their clients'
private interests zealously within the bounds of the law. 5 But criminal
litigation is different, and one might reasonably expect there should
be less tolerance for gamesmanship. In contrast to an attorney in civil
litigation, a prosecutor does not represent a private client; he
represents the entire community. 6 And, as the most powerful official
in the criminal justice system, the prosecutor effectively decides
whether a person should live, die, be incarcerated for life, or receive
special· benefits and immunities. 7 Finally, a prosecutor is
constitutionally and ethically obligated to carrying out his
responsibilities to promote public justice rather than private
vengeance: There is no place in such a regime for prosecutorial
gamesmanship.
Moreover, the criminal justice system typically features an
imbalance in power and resources that increasingly favors the
prosecutor and therefore makes gamesmanship even less acceptable.
Most commentators would agree that the balance of advantage in the
criminal justice system tilts heavily to the prosecutor. 9 This is
noticeable in every phase of the process, but most notably in the
aphorism that the rules regulating misconduct by prosecutors are seen by prosecutors as
"pretend rules" when courts do not enforce them. See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co.,
155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d C;r. 1946) (Frank, J., d;ssenl;ng).
4 The tenn "gamesmanship" has been employed to describe a prosecutor's treatment of
Brady. See United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298,,1310 (3d Cir. 1984)("this court has been
faced with annoying frequency with gamesmanship by some prosecutors with respect to the
duty to disclose"k United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 265_ (3d Cir. 1984) ("the [Brady]
game will go on, but justice will suffer"). See also Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From
Adversaria/ Gamesmanship Toward the Search for Innocence?, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STORIES, (Carol S. Streiker ed. 2006), at 129.
5 See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, Canon·· 7 ("A lawyer should represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law.").
6 -See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, Standard 3~3.2 cmt. (''the prosecutor's client is not
the victim but the people who live in the prosecutor's jurisdiction").
7 See Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 813 (1987) ("Between the private life of the
citizen and th public glare· of accusation stands the prosecutor. That state official· has the power
to employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given individuaL").
8 See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, R. 3.8, emt. I ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of
a minister ofjustice and not simply that of an advocate."); MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-13
('The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to
seek-justice, not merely to convict."); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, Standard 3~1.2(c) ("The
duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
9 See YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE LA FAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY KING, MODERN
CRIMIN"AL PROCEDURE 1221 (11th ed. 2002); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 809 (6th ed. 2000) ("[T]he prosecutor has become the most
powerful office in the criminal justice system.").
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prosecutor's control over the evidence relevant to a defendant's guilt.
The prosecutor's acquisition of evidence from a broad variety of
sources, his ability to sift, evaluate, and test this information in
private, coupled with a defendant's limited ability to uncover
evidence advantageous to his case, recalls Justice Brennan's famous
metaphor that the criminal process may be more like a "sporting
event" than a quest for truth. 1O And there is no better illustration of
this than the prosecutor's treatment of Brady.
In fact, no rule in criminal procedure has been as controversial,
and has generated as much gamesmanship, as the Brady rule. This is
not surprising. Brady depends on the integrity, good faith, and
professionalism of the prosecutor for its effectiveness. But at the same
time, Brady presents a siguificant and unique departure from the
traditional, adversarial mode of litigation. This schizophrenic
situation means that the effective enforcement of Brady is an ideal of
justice that may be impossible to achieve. It requires a prosecutor to
balance competing and contradictory objectives, and is so malleable
that it affords prosecutors an extremely broad opportunity to exercise
discretion in ways that impede--rather than promote--the search for
truth. Not surprisingly, violations of Brady are the most recurring and
pervasive of all constitutional procedural violations, with disastrous
consequences: innocent people are wrongfully convicted, imprisoned,
and even executed;ll the reputation of U.S. prosecutors suffers;12 and
the absence of meaningful legal and ethical enforcement and
accountability has a corrosive effect on the public's perception of a
justice system that often appears to be arbitrary, unjust, and simply
unreliable. 13
The manner in which Brady is treated in federal and state courts
reveals a confusing and inconsistent understanding and application of
its objectives. This dysfunctional treatment is largely attributable to
10 William J. Brennan, Jr" The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event a/Questfor Truth?,
1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279. For an update to that famous article, see William J. Brennan, The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest/or Troth? A Progress Report, 1990 WASH. D.
L.Q.1.
11 See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on "Brady v. Maryland n, 47 S. TEx. L. REV.
685,688 (2006).
12 Several recent studies have documented widespread abuses by U.S. prosecutors that
have' seriously damaged the reputation of prosecutors as "ministers of justice." See, e.g.,
Frederic N. Tulsky, Tainted Trials: Stolen Justice, MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 22,' 2006, at 1; Steve
Weinberg, HannjUI Error, THE CENTER FOR PuBLIC INTEGRITY (2003); Ken Annstrong &
Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Jan. 10, 1999, at 1.
13 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDCIDCSL L. REv. 275; 299 (2004) (arguing that misconduct by
prosecutors and lack of meaningful· discipline and accountability has eroded public confidence
in integrity of criminal justice system).
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the Supreme Court's permissive approach to prosecutorial discretion
as well as a hands-off approach by judicial, legislative, and
disciplinary bodies. Brady is enforced by the judiciary through widely
inconsistent approaches as to what constitutes Brady evidence, the
specific types of information required to be disclosed, when it must
be disclosed, and the sanctions for noncompliance.!4 In addition,
given the various enforcement protocols of different prosecutors
offices, and even of individual prosecutors in the same office,15 it is
virtually impossible to identify clear and consistent norms of
compliance by prosecutors as to what evidence is required to be
disclosed, when it must be disclosed, and permissible reasons for
noncompliance. As a result, prosecutors are encouraged to play the
Brady game without meaningful legal or ethical oversight or
resistance.
OVERVIEW OF BRADY LITIGATION

Brady litigation spans the entire life of a criminal case, from the
time a defendant is arraigned on a criminal charge, to pre-trial and
trial proceedings, to the period following his conviction, to when he is
incarcerated, and in some cases on Death Row awaiting execution.
Typically, a defendant-at his arraignment on a federal criminal
charge-makes a motion for discovery pursuant to Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in all fifty states pursuant to
their individual rules and statutes governing discovery. A defendant
typically includes a request for Brady evidence in his initial discovery
motion.
Prosecutorial disclosure of Brady evidence is not automatic.
Prosecutors are typically required to provide Brady evidence only
upon a request.!6 Based on my experience, some prosecutors disclose
Brady evidence early in the proceedings, along with their disclosure
of other discovery materials. Most commonly, a prosecutor will
respond to a Brady request by representing that he is aware of his
obligation under Brady and will comply. Most federal and state
jurisdictions do not mandate the disclosure of Brady evidence within
14 See Treatment of Brady v. Maryland Material in United States District and State
Courts' Rules, Orders, and Policies, REpORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL

RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, (Federal Judicial Center2004)

[hereafter "Advisory Committee Report'1.
IS See Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary
Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1511, 1521-22 (2000) (noting "significant disparity" in
policies of different prosecutor offices with respect to discovery); Kenneth J. Melilli,
Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REv. 669, 684 (noting
differences among offices and among prosecutors within same office).
16 See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14, at 11, 22-3.
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a specified time period,'7 nor do they specifY any dne diligence
requirements npon prosecutors.'8 No federal district imposes
sanctions or remedies for a prosecutor's nondisclosure or untimely
disclosure of Brady evidence." All states, by contrast, provide
remedies for prosecutorial nondisclosure that track Rule l6(d)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including granting a
continuance or disallowing proof relating to the Brady violation. 20
A prosecutor may comply with his discovery and Brady
obligations in several ways. A prosecutor may furnish the defense
with all evidence specifically required by the rules of discovery, as
well as all exculpatory and impeachment evidence the prosecutor
believes is required to be disclosed under Brady. Some prosecutors
may go beyond the strictures of discovery rules and furnish a
defendant with the entire file of the case, including all potentially
Brady evidence?' And some prosecutors, alert to their Brady
obligation, may seek the court's assistance in determining whether
and to what extent they are required to comply with Brady?2 Since a
prosecutor's Brady duty is a continuing one,>' a prosecutor is
obligated-throughout the pre-trial and trial proceedings-to disclose
Brady evidence when he learns about it, and is required to make a
diligent search for Brady evidence in places where Brady evidence is
readily available. 24 Moreover, after initially receiving discovery
materials and gaining more familiarity with the case, a defendant may
make a further and more focused request for Brady evidence to which
the prosecutor is obligated to respond. Needless to say, a belated
Id. at 12-13, 23-24.
Id. at 14; 27.
19 Id. at 14-15.
20 !d. at 27-28.
2\ See infra notes 65-92, and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2004) (in camera review to
ensure safety of government witnesses); United States v. Pena, 227 F.3d 23 (2d Crr. 2000) (in
camera review of confidential pretrial services and. pre-sentence reports of government
witnesses); United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.ld 456 (1st Cit. 1993) (ex parte proceeding to
determine whether sensitive material in prosecutor's files was Brady material). The Supreme
Court has suggested that in some circumstances such pre-trial review would be appropriate. See
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).
23 The Supreme Court's treatment of Brady has routinely viewed the prosecutor's duty as
a continuing one. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (due process violated
where prosecutor learned during trial that committed perjury but failed to inform defendant).
See also Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14, at 13, 26 (noting federal and state courts
that explicitly make the prosecutor's disclosure obligation "a continuing one."). Moreover, the
prosecutor's duty under Brady does not end with the verdict but continues. See Canion v. Cole,
91 P.3d 355, 360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) ("The defendant's right to due process with regard to the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence does not cease to exist after the verdict is rendered; the
prosecution has a continuing duty to provide such evidence as was unlawfully withheld'').
24 See infra notes 102-137, and accompanying text.
17
18
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disclosure of Brady evidence typically generates a claim by the
defendant that the prosecntor-through his untimely disclosure-has
impaired the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial?'
When a defendant pleads guilty or the case goes to trial, there is a
presumption that a prosecutor has complied with his disclosure
obligations. 2• However, it is commonly believed that most Brady
evidence never gets disclosed; rather, it remains buried in drawers,
boxes, and file cabinets in the offices of the prosecutor, the police,
and other law enforcement and government agencies connected to the
case. 27 The Brady decisions we read only present a very small and
select sampling of exculpatory and impeachment evidence that has
been discovered after the trial. When Brady evidence is discovered
after the trial but before an appeal, a defendant may make a motion
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, or raise the Brady
issue on his appeal. 28 Post-conviction, Brady litigation most often
occurs when a defendant who is incarcerated for a long prison tenn,
or who awaits execution, has discovered that Brady evidence that was
concealed from him during his trial seeks to vacate his conviction and
sentence because of the prosecutor's unconstitutional nondisclosure.
Defendants who have been convicted by a guilty plea,29 or have
25
26

See infra notes 153-164, and accompanying text.
See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899,909 (1997) (quoting United States v. Chemical

Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)) ("Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have
properly discharged their official duties.").
27 See United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1996) (''the government's
failure to turn over exculpatory information in its possession is unlikely to be discovered and

thus largely unreviewable"); United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1984)
("material favorable to the defense may never emerge from secret government files"). See a/so
Elizabeth Napier Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450, 1455
(2006) ("Defendants only rarely unearth suppr.essions."); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Perjury and
False Testimony: Should the Difference Matter So Much?, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1537, 1579
(2000) (arguing that in most cases, "withheld evidence will never see the light of day"); Tracy
L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct
With Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 851, 909 (1995) ("it is probably fair to say that
many instances of Braa}!-type misconduct are never discovered and hence never reported").
28 See infra notes 165-174 and accompanying text.
29 The extent to which Braa}! applies in the context of plea bargaining and guilty pleas is
unclear. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 958 (1989) (noting that although Brady issues are raised in the plea
bargaining process, the extent of a prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence during
plea negotiations is unclear). The Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor does not suppress
evidence under Brady when he fails to disclose, during plea negotiations, evidence that a
defendant could use at trial to impeach a government witness. See United States v. Ruiz, 536
U.S. 622, 623 (2002). However, Brady may apply in the plea bargaining process when the
prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence was sufficiently outrageous as to constitute a material
misrepresentation rendering the plea involuntary. See Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278,
293 (1st Cir. 2006) ("government's nondisclosure was so outrageous that it constituted
impennissible prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to ground the petitioner's claim that his guilty
plea was involuntary."); Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 364 n. 15 (5th Cir.' 2000) (even if
nondisclosure is not a Brady violation, there may be situations in which the prosecutor's
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completed their prison sentence, usually do not search for undisclosed
Brady evidence or raise and litigate a Brady claim. Moreover,
because a prosecutor ordinarily enjoys absolute immunity from civil
liability for Brady violations,3o and it is unlikely that a defendant
whose case has been completed and who is no longer .incarcerated
will seek to litigate a civil rights action against the prosecutor.
How does undisclosed Brady evidence get discovered after the
trial? Brady evidence may be discovered after conviction in different
ways. Sometimes a defendant is able to locate such evidence pursuant
to a request under the Freedom of Information Act." A defendant
may initiate his own investigation, usually through relatives and
friends, to attempt to locate witoesses to prove that the prosecutor
suppressed Brady evidence. 32 Additional Brady evidence may be
discovered after a court grants an evidentiary hearing, orders
discovery, and takes testimony on a defendant's motion to vacate the
conviction. 33 And there have been instances when Brady evidence is
discovered serendipitously.34
Assuming that previously undisclosed Brady evidence has been
discovered after conviction, and assuming further that there are no
procedural obstacles that would bar review, a court addressing the
merits of a Brady claim must answer three questions: (1) Did the
prosecutor suppress evidence? (2) Was the evidence favorable to the
accused? (3) Was the suppression prejudicial to the accused? These
three questions comprise what are commonly referred to as the "three
components of a true Brady violation."" They are the basis not only
for examining the judiciary's interpretation and application of the
Brady rule, but also for examining the tactics that prosecutors

nondisclosure makes it "impossible [for defendant].to enter a knowing and intelligent plea.").
30 See, e.g., Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2003); Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d
372 (4th Cir. 1996).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 671 (1985).
32 See, e.g., State v. Larkins, 2003 WL 22510579 (Ohio App. 8th). (Bishop Alfred Nickles

filed a public records request with the Cleveland Police Department, seeking the same police
reports previously denied to Larkins, and after receiving the documents, forwarded them to
Larkins).
33 See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 278 (1999).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 933 (4th Cir. 1994) (Brady evidence
discovered by U.S. probation officer during routine pre-sentence investigation which revealed
documents casting doubt on the credibility of key government witness); Sean Gardner, $5
Million Cannot Undo 7 Years; City Settles Over Wrong Conviction, NEWSDAY, Dec. 17,2003
(Brady evidence inadvertently discovered by an investigator for an insurance company
representing New York City and a day care center in a civil lawsuit brought by parents of the
victim of a sexual abuse crirrie).
35 See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82.
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employ, and the games that prosecutors play, to avoid complying with
Brady.
THE METAPHOR OF GAMES

Discussion of U.S. litigation frequently employs the metaphors of
sports and games. We refer to contests, fights, winning, losing, fair
play, foul play, harmful errors, harmless errors, plain errors, points,
and penalties. Discovery doctrine also makes reference to games,
especially when the issue involves the difficulty for one party to
acquire relevant information, and the duty of the other party to
disclose relevant information to the adversary. The Supreme Court
long ago recognized that one of the overriding objectives of the rules
of discovery was to make a trial "less a gamc of blind man's bluff and
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the
fullest practicable extent."'· More recently, the Court has invoked the
games of"gambling,,,37 "hide and seek,,,38 and "scavenger hunts,,39 to
characterize the perverse conduct of prosecutors in seeking to avoid
their responsibilities under Brady. Indeed, there is probably no better
context in which to examine prosecutorial gamesmanship than in
connection with the Brady rule. What follows are the games that
prosecutors most commonly play to avoid compliance with Brady.
These games include charades, scavenger hunts, gambling, blind
man's bluff, hide and seek, delay and conquer, obstacle courses,
mazes, and Simon Sez. And, needless to say, prosecutors win almost
all the time.
CHARADES: DISGUISE AND DECEIVE

One of the most insidious prosecutorial schemes to subvert Brady
is the orchestration of a plan whereby a key prosecution witness, who
ordinarily would have a motive to lie by virtue of having made a deal
with the govemment, testifies that no deal was made. In fact, the
witness's testimony that he has made no deal with the prosecutor may
be accurate because the witness himself may not know about it.
Unbeknownst to the judge, the jury, and the witness himself, a
36

37

United States v. Procter & Gamble Company, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 701 (Marshall, 1., dissenting) (Brady "invites a prosecutor, whose

interests are conflicting, to gamble, to play the odds").
38 Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) ("A rule thus declaring 'prosecution may
hide, defendant must seek,' is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord
defendants due process.").
39 Id at 695 ("Our decisions lend no support to the notion that defendants must scavenge
for hints of undisclosed Brady material when the prosecution represents that all such material
has been disclosed.").
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prosecutor may make a deal with a witness's attorney in which the
prosecutor agrees to reward the witness for his testimony as long as
the attorney's promises not to tell his client about the agreement.
Employing this charade, the prosecutor can later claim that the
witness's testimony about the absence of a deal is not peIjury and
there was no. deal with the witness motivating him to provide
impeachable testimony. How often prosecutors engage in this game is
difficult to say. Several cases have been reported that describe such
conduct. In Hayes v. Brown,'o for example, the prosecutor made an
agreement with the attorney for a key witness in a murder case to give
the witness transactional immunity and dismiss other pending charges
in exchange for his client's testimony. However, seeking to keep the
arrangement from the judge and jury, the prosecutor extracted a
promise from the witriess's attorney that he would not tell his client
about the deal; in that way, the witness could honestly testify without
peIjuring himself because he would not be personally informed of the
dea1. 41 At the trial, when the defendant's attorney asked the
prosecutor whether there had been any negotiated settlement in
exchange for the witness's testimony, the prosecutor responded in
open court that "[t]here has been absolutely no negotiations
whatsoever in regard to his testimony,,,42 and that there were
"absolutely no promises and no discussions in regard to any pending
charges.,,43
On appeal following the conviction, after this charade was
divulged, the government argued that the witness did not give false
testimony, and therefore the prosecutor did not violate the Brady rule
by allowing false testimony to be given without correction. Rejecting
this argument in scathing language, the Ninth Circuit observed: "It is
reprehensible for the State to seek refuge in the claim that a witness
did not commit peIjury, when the witness unknowingly presents false
testimony at the behest of the State.,,44 Citing a series of Supreme
Court decisions involving a prosecutor's presentation of false
testimony,45 the appellate court vacated the conviction and harshly
" 399 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane).
41 Although the court assumed that the witness was unaware of the deal, the court noted
the "distinct risk that, in preparing [the witness] for his testimony, [the witness's] counsel~who
did know about the deal-might have influenced the content of that testimony, deliberately or
not." ld at 981 n. 1.
42 Id. at 979.
43 ld at 980.
44 fd. at 981. See also Wilhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247,251 (9th Cir. 1990) (Trott, J.,

concurring) ("This saves [the witness] from perjury, but it does not make his testimony
truthful.").
45 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
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condemned the prosecutor's scheme as a "covert subornation of
peIjury. ,,46
A similar-but less overt-form of prosecutorial gamesmanship
that achieves the same objective is the prosecutor's ploy of makiug a
tacit deal with a witness without actually verbalizing the agreement.
For example, a witness may approach a prosecutor and seek to make a
deal for his testimony. A prosecutor may reward the witness without
verbalizing or memorializing his intention. A prosecutor could
thereby claim that he did not violate Brady by soliciting the testimony
of a cooperating witness who could credibly say he made no deal and
received no benefits for his testimony. Some courts actually allow the
prosecutor to engage in this type of charade, as long as the prosecutor
does not make an overt promise of assistance before the witness
testifies, even if the prosecutor in fact intends to reward the witness
with favorable treatment after the testimony and does SO.47 It is not
difficult to imagine, as one court observed, that "such a formalistic
and technical evasion would eviscerate the Brady rule.,,48 Given the
potential for gamesmanship and abuse, many courts agree that
allowing a prosecutor to make such a secret agreement would be a
means for a prosecutor to circumvent his Brady obligation. 49 Thus, as
reported in Bell v. Bell,'o where a witness approached the prosecutor
and sought benefits from the prosecutor (and, the court noted, most
cooperating witnesses do not testifY from altruistic motives") and the
prosecutor understood this expectation and fulfilled the witness's
expectation by actually bestowing .benefits, the court found an
implied agreement that reasonably impacted on the witness's
credibility.52 To allow this type charade not to be disclosed, the court
observed, merely encourages further gamesmanship. 53
46 399 F.3d at 981. See also People v. Steadman, 623 N.E.2d 509; 511 (N.Y. 1993)
("scheme employed by the District Attorney's office undennines [Brady]" and "cannot be
condoned.").
47 Shabazz v.. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (favorable treatment for witness
insufficient to show agreement between prosecu~ion and witness).
48 Bell v. Bell, 460 F.3d 739, 753 (6th Cir. 2006), reh'g granted en bane, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32575.
49 ld at 754-55 (6th Cir. 2006); Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 323-24 (7th Cir. 2005)
(tacit understanding between prosecution and witness must be disclosed); Reutter v. Solem, 888
F.2d 578, 581 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682,685 (9th Cir. 1986).
" 460 F3d 739 (6th Cir. 2006).
5\ Bell v. Bell, 460 F.3d at 753 ("a jailhouse infonnant is one of the least likely.candidates
for altruistic behavior; his offer to testify is almost always coupled with an expectation of some
benefit in return.").
52 Id at 755 ("A tacit agreement must be disclosed regardless of when the prosecution acts
upon that agreement.").
53 Id. (court's rule "is necessary to prevent the prosecution from shirking its Brady
responsibilities by simply waiting until after the petitioner's trial to act upon the tacit
agreemenC').
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Prosecutors have concocted similarly deceptive schemes to subvert
the Brady rule and thereby insulate their witnesses from attacks on
their credibility. For example, in Silva v. Brown, the prosecutor made
a secret deal with the attorney for a key witness to forestall a
psychiatric examination of the witness prior to his testimony.54 The
witness was the accomplice in a murder who had sustained severe
brain damage years earlier. The witness's attorney planned to have his
client psychiatrically evaluated after his arraigmnent because he was
either nnable to cooperate in his defense or was insane. However,
because a psychiatric evaluation would have to be disclosed and
nnder Brady would "supply ammunition to the defense," the
prosecutor struck a bargain with the witness's lawyer under which he
would delay the examination until after the witness's testimony in
exchange for dismissing the murder charges against his client. 55
According to the appellate court, which reversed the defendant's
conviction, the "prosecutor's unscrupulous decision to keep secret the
deal he made to prevent an evaluation of the competence of the
State's star witness" was crucial impeaching evidence under Brady
because, as the prosecutor well knew, the examination results would
have had a powerful impact on the jury's assessment of the witness's
testimony.'6 Moreover, "the very fact that the [prosecutor] had sought
to keep evidence of [the witness's] mental capacity away from the
jury might have diminished the State's own credibility as a presenter
of evidence. ,,57
Finally, the connection between a prosecutor's nondisclosure of
Brady evidence and his coaching of a witness should be noted.
Improper coaching is itself a form of lawyer gamesmanship. It has
been called one of the "dark secrets" of the U.S. adversary system in
the way it undermines the search for truth, 58 and is very difficult to
detect because neither the lawyer nor the witness would reveal the
secret. Sometimes the coaching is obvious. In a recent egregious caSe,
undisclosed Brady evidence depicted a federal prosecutor ordering a
police investigator to take a recanting witness out of the room and
"straighten him out."'9 Indeed, one of the prominent features in
" 416 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2005).
55Id.
56 Id. at991.
57 Id. at 988.
58 John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEx. L. REv. 277, 279 (1989) ("Witness
preparation is treated as one of the dark secrets of the legal profession.").
59 Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 282 (1st Cir. 2006). The court found that the
prosecutor "manipulated the witness and deliberately tried to cover up the evidence," and that
this "blatant misconduct .. , was so outrageous that it constituted impermissible prosecutorial
misconduct sufficient to ground the petitioner's claim that his guilty plea was involuntary." Id.
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several of the Supreme Court's Brady decisions has been an effort by
the prosecutor to coach witnesses in order to avoid revealing the
existence of Brady evidence. In Banksv. Dretke,60 a key piece of
suppressed evidence was a transcript of a practice session showing
how the prosecutor "intensively coached" and "closely rehearsed" the
testimony of witnesses. In Kyles v. Whitley,61 there was a clear
implication of coaching from the suppressed evidence that would
have shown how the witness's testimony became much more precise
at are-trial.62
A good example of a prosecutor's manipulating a witness to evade
Brady is Walker v. City of New York, in which a prosecutor almost
certainly coached a cooperating witness to give false testimony to
conceal information that would have destroyed the witness's
credibility.63 In Walker, the cooperating witness in a murder
prosecution initially identified two individnals as the perpetrators.
However, when the prosecutor learned that one of these alleged
perpetrators could not have committed the crime because he was in
prison at the time, he elicited testimony from the cooperator, before
the grand jury and at trial, that he did not mention a second
accomplice. The appellate court, in reversing the conviction,
condemned the prosecutor's failure to disclose the stark inconsistency
in the witness's story, but the implication of witness manipulation is
obvious.
THE SCAVENGER HUNT: OPEN FILE DISCOVERY

Some prosecutors represent that their office maintains a so-called
"open file" discovery policy, whereby the entire file of a case is
routinely made available to the defense, in all cases, well in advance
of the trial. To be sure, an open file policy may be a responsible
means of insuring a fair and orderly prosecution. According to one
prosecutor, "We're taking the approach now that every document that
we gather in the course of an investigation will be made available to
the defense. And it should be made available at the time of
arraignment.,,64 Under such an open-file approach, materials that are

at 293.
'" 540 U.s. 668, 677, 685, 705 (2004).
61 514 U.s. 419,443,443 n.14, 454 (1995).
62 For other Brady decisions by the Supreme Court that appear to have involved a
prosecutor's coaching ofwitnesses, see Strickler, 527 U.S. 263; Alcorta, 355 U.S. 28.
63 974 F.2d 293, 295, 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
64 Panel Discussion, Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 781, 786
(1999) (comments of G. Douglas Jones, United States Attorney for the Northern District of
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often viewed as critical to defense discovery, including a list of the
gove=ent's witnesses, statements of those witnesses, smmnaries of
statements made by witnesses, and relevant police reports, are turned
over to the defense early in the case. 65 An open file policy that
discloses every relevant item in the government's case to the defense
may, theoretically, offer a better chance of a prosecutor complying
with Brady than a more restrictive discovery approach. 66 However,
even under the most expansive open file policy, prosecutors typically
make a distinction between what is required under discovery rules,
and what is required under Brady, disclosing the former but not the
latter:7
Prosecutors ostensibly maintain an open file policy for several
reasons. Such a policy may enhance a prosecutor's reputation for
transparency and fairness. It may also foster in judges and defense
lawyers a sense of trust of the prosecutor that reduces the occasions
for contentious discovery litigation. And an open file arrangement
may encourage defendants to plead guilty in the belief that having
been fully informed about the prosecution's case, they may assume
that they will receive a favorable bargain from a prosecutor who acts
with integrity. To be sure, this informal arrangement defies
generalization, because as many commentators have observed, it is
implemented in vastly different ways, by different offices, and
indeed, by different prosecutors in the same office:'
Given the superficial attractiveness of an open file policy, and the
institutional benefits allegedly accruing from such a policy, one might
assume that such a policy enhances a defendant's ability to obtain
more complete discovery, including the disclosure of Brady evidence,
well in advance of trial, enabling a defendant to make an informed

Alabama) [hereinafter Panel Discussion].
65 Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary
Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1511, 1522 (2000) ("Some defense attorneys are fortunate to
practice in jurisdictions that have "open-file" discovery practices and thus receive the material
early in the case.").
.
66 This assumes, of course, that the prosecutor has carefully reviewed the file, is aware of
the details in the file, including potential Brady material, and has made the decision to disclose
all of this information to the defense. However, this assumption is not necessarily justified. See
Panel Discussion, supra note 65, at 805 (comments of Art Leach, Assistant United States
Attorney and chief of Organized Crime Strike Force) ("open file discovery is the lazy approach
to handling discovery" because prosecutors are "unaware of many details that appear in what
you are presenting for discovery").
67 See Panel Discussion, supra note 65, at 786 (comments of U.S. Attorney Jones) (open
file discovery "doesn't necessarily include the 'Brady' material").
68 See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 461 (2001) ("Different prosecutors may offer 'open file
discovery' and have vastly different ideas of what that means.'');
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decision whether to go to trial or plead guilty. However, this
assumption may be flawed. To the extent that an open file policy
represents to a defendant that a prosecutor has disclosed everything in
her file relevant to the case, it may lull a defendant into believing that
he need take no further action to enforce discovery requirements. In
such a case, an open file policy may become a trap for the unwary.
Through the pretense of transparency, prosecutors have the ability to
not only withhold Brady evidence-as they may do in any case--but
also by suggesting that full disclosure has been made, forestall any
further inquiry and, in fact, change the nature of the defense. Indeed,
several of the most egregious Brady violations have been reported in
cases where prosecutors represented that they allegedly maintained an
open file policy and had claimed to disclose everything in the file
relating to the case, including Brady evidence"·
The opportunities for gamesmanship under an open file policy are
considerable. First, so-called open file discovery is really a misnomer.
Even those prosecutors who boast that, upon arraigument, they
disclose to defendants every document that has been gathered in the
course of an investigation, from every agency involved in the
investigation-including the statements of witnesses and other
evidence material to the defense---eandidly acknowledge that much
evidence is not disclosed under this policy and that defendants must
scavenge for additional evidence. 7o Among the evidence that is not
ordinarily disclosed are a prosecutor's work product, summaries of
interviews with witnesses, notes and communications with other law
enforcement officials, information that is privileged or confidential,
and information whose disclosure might threaten the safety of
witnesses. 71
69 See, e.g., Banks, 540 U.S. at 693 (prosecution represented that it had fully disc10sedall
relevant information its file contained; file did not include critical exculpatory information
relating to one of state's key witness); Strickler, 527 U.S. at 276 n. 14 (prosecutor told petitioner
that the prosecutor's files were open and thus there was no need for a formal Brady motion;
prosecution file given to the petitioner did not include several important documents prepared by
one of the prosecutor's key witnesses).
10 Panel Discussion, supra note 65, at 786-87 (comments of U.S. Attorney Jones) (noting
that open fIle discovery may not include summaries of witness interviews or statements of
witnesses whose safety needs to be protected).
71 Id at 787-88 (evidence withheld to protect safety of witnesses); Id at 805 (agent's
notes of interviews with witnesses not required to be disclosed); Id. at 805 ("work producf'
evidence reflecting prosecutor's impressions, strategies, and legal theories not required to be
disclosed). See Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian Roulette:· Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF. J.
33, 55 858 (2004) (discussing extent to which privileged communications· are able to be
disclosed under Brady). The Supreme Court has not decided whether a prosecutor's ''work
product" must be disclosed under Brady. However, lower courts have discussed the question of
whether a prosecutor's ''work product"· that includes Brady evidence must be disclosed.
Compare Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 2006) (Brady rule does not extend to
prosecutor's work product because it "would greatly impair the government's ability to prepare
M
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Second, prosecutors acknowledge that even under the most liberal
open file policy, open file disclosure does not necessarily include all
relevant documents, including Brady evidence. 72 Prosecutors know
that Brady evidence may be in the files of other government agencies,
i.e., the police and other law enforcement agencies involved in the
investigation. 73 To the extent that a prosecutor represents that he
maintains an open file policy, he knows that he may be misleading the
defense into believing they are getting a complete file. A good
example is Strickler v. Greene,74 where the prosecutor allegedly
maintained an open file policy that allowed the defense to inspect the
entire case file, including police reports and witness statements.
However, several items of evidence that would have seriously
discredited a key prosecution witness were not included in the file;
they were located in the files of the police and the prosecutor's office
in a different county. Relying on the prosecutor's open file
representation, defense counsel did not file a pre-trial motion for
Brady evidence. 75 Thus, whether from negligence or deceit, the
prosecutor's assurance caused the defense not to hunt for additional
evidence.
That an open file policy may result in Brady evidence being
withheld by other government officials, including other prosecutors,
and not disclosed to the prosecutor who is preparing the case for trial,
should not be a surprise. Governmental agencies involved in an
investigation may decide not to disclose Brady evidence to the
prosecutor for various reasons, including a fear that disclosure may
undermine the safety of witnesses, compromise the integrity of the
case, or damage other ongoing investigations. The relationship
between prosecutors and the police has not been sufficiently
examined with respect to the formulation and dissemination of rules
and policies for the creation, retention, and disclosure of Brady
evidence. But it is reasonable to expect that some prosecutors,
particularly those who are young and inexperienced, may not press

for trials") and Williamson v.Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1182 (lIth Cit. 2000) (reaching the same
conclusion as Morris regarding prosecutor's work) with Mincey v. Head, 206F.3d 1106, 1133
n. 63 (11th CiT. 2000) (citing lower federal and state court cases and noting "that most have
concluded that there is no automatic exemption from disclosure of work product under Brady").
72 Id. at 786 (open fIle "doesn't necessarily include the Brady material).
73 See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
" 527 U.S. 263, 276 (1999).
75·Id. The Court noted that "if a prosecutor asserts that he complies with Brady through an
open file policy, defense counsel may reasonably rely on that file to contain all materials the
State is constitutionally obligated to disclose under Brady." ld. at 283 n. 23.
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the more experienced police agents too hard. 7• Moreover, there are
occasions when the competitive relationship between federal and state
law enforcement agencies may result in important evidence in the
possession of federal officials being withheld from their state
counterparts. 77
Third, an open file policy may provide a prosecutor with an
opportunity to conceal Brady evidence with the excuse that he
inadvertently slipped Up.78 For example, the prosecutor in the Duke
lacrosse rape case, Michael B. Nifong, the former District Attorney of
Durham, North Carolina, who apparently had a reputation for giving
defense lawyers open access to his evidence,79 was recently disbarred
for suppressing critical exculpatory evidence--a finding by a
laboratory that showed DNA evidence from four unidentified men on
the clothes of the alleged victim, but no DNA evidence from any
lacrosse player. so Indeed, the director of the laboratory testified that
this information was excluded from his report at the prosecutor's
direction, notwithstanding the prosecutor's representation to the court
that the report was a complete description of the laboratory's
findings. S! The prosecutor's excuse for his failure to disclose the
information was that it got lost in the massive amount of evidence in
76 See United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324 (9th Cir. 1993) (commenting on
"disastrous consequences" from young. untrained, and ambitious prosecutors). See also
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 295 (3d ed. 2001) ("Many prosecutors

are relatively young, inexperienced, and ambitious, which makes them particularly vulnerable to

adversarial pressures."); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With Federal Prosecutors:
Experiences a/Troth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 917, 945 (1999). ("The
relationship between the prosecutor and the agent who investigated the case has also resulted in
assistants acting in a less than diligent fashion'').
77 See People v. Santorelli, 741 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y. 2000) (no Brady violation where FBI
refused to turn over to state prosecutor interview reports with key witness obtained during
independent and preexisting federal investigation).
78 See Douglass, supra note 69, at 461 ("The Brady case law is filled with examples of
defendants who received "open file" discovery from well-meaning, but negligent prosecutors.").
79 See David Barstow and Duff Wilson, DNA Witness Jolted Dynamic ofDuke Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006 ("[Nifong] has long been known locally for giving defense lawyers open
access to his evidence, even before a state law required that.'').
80 See Duff Wilson, Hearing Ends in Disbarment For Prosecutor in Duke Case. N.Y.
TIMES, June 17,2007, at 21.
81 Id. After the court asked Nifong: "So you represent that there are no other statements
from Dr. Meehan?" Nifong replied: ''No other statements ... No other statements made to me."
Nifong has been charged in an ethics complaint by the North Carolina State Bar with making
inflammatory statements to the media and misleading the public about evidence in the case. See
David Barstow and Duff Wilson, Prosecutor in Duke Case Faces Ethics Complaint, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2006. Following the ethics complaint, the State Attorney General, at Nifong's
request, took over the prosecution and after conducting his own investigation, dismissed the
charges against the three former Duke lacrosse players, declaring them to be innocent and
wrongly accused by an "unchecked" and "overreaching" district attorney. See David Barstow
and Duff Wilson, Duke Prosecutor Throws Out Case Against Players, N.Y.TIMES, April 12,
2007, at A!.
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the case, and that he was distracted by other pressing matters in his
office. "You know," he stated, "it's not the only case I have right

now.,,82
Even assuming that prosecutors who administer a well-intentioned
open file policy may inadvertently omit some crucial Brady evidence,
there is no doubt that some unscrupulous prosecutors intentionally
administer an open file arrangement to trap an unwary defense
counsel into believing that he has received full disclosure and that he
need not engage in further and unnecessary discovery litigation. One
of the most notorious perpetrators of this type of misconduct is the
former chief prosecutor in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Carmen Marino.
As anybody who has followed Marino's prosecutorial career is aware,
he has been the subject of widespread criticism by courts and
commentators for his overzealous and unethical conduct. 83 In several
cases, particularly capital prosecutions, Marino's practice was to
"open" his files to the inspection and discovery by the defense. 84
According to testimony by defense lawyers, Marino's custom was to
have his colleagues lead members of the defense team into the
prosecutor's office "to allow defense counsel to look at the file.,,85
Under this arrangement, "the defense was not permitted to physically
82 See Barstow and Duff, supra note 80. Nifong's justification for failing to disclose the
DNA evidence is not unusual. Prosecutors frequently argue that excessive workloads,
inadequate funding, and the involvement of many government agencies in an investigation
places an unfair burden on prosecutors to. comply with Brady. See, e.g., ACHIEVING JUSTICE:

FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY, REpORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION'S AD Hoc INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL

PROCESS (2006) at xxvii (prosecutors' "daily struggle to handle each day's crises," together
with "enormous workloads" and "without adequate funding ... makes it hard for prosecutors to
ensure [compliance with Brady]"); Peter J. Henning, Defense Discovery in White Collar
Criminal Prosecutions, 15 GA. ST. u.L. REv. 601, 604, 617 (1999) (''proliferating proceedings,"
"avalanche of documents" and involvement in investigation of many other government agencies
would be "disruptive" and "impose an unfair burden on the Government."). But see Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) ("To the extent [Brady's disclosure duty] places a
burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures and regulations can be established to carry
that burden and to insure communication of all relevant infonnation on each case to every
lawyer who deals with it.").
83 See In re Lott, 366 F.3d 431, 433 n.1 (6th Crr. 2004) (citing ten cases in which Ohio
state courts found that Marino engaged in prosecutorial misconduct); - Steven Weinberg,

Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a Prosecutor is Citedfor Misconduct?,

THE CENTER FOR

PUBLIC INTEGRITY (2003) (identifYing Carmen Marino as a ''recidivist prosecutor" who has
frequently been cited for misconduct); Regina Brett, A prosecutor's Win Not Always Justice,
THE PLAIN DEALER, July 12, 2006 (according to Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge
Daniel Gaul: "Marino should be criminally prosecuted for the abuses. It's nothing but one
deceitful act after another. To permit anyone to be put to death after being prosecuted by
Carmen Marino would be so ethically inappropriate you'd almost be culpable yourself.").
84 See D'Ambrosio v. Bagley, 2006 WL 1169926, at *17-18 (N.D. Ohio) (describing the
open file policy in Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office); State v. Larkins, 2003 WL
22510579; *3 (Ohio App. 8th) (witnesses at hearing "all attested to the 'open' discovery policy
of Marino").
85Id
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view the police reports and a prosecutor read them to defense
counsel."'· Nevertheless, this practice was a ploy by Marino to lull
the defense into believing it had received a complete accounting of
the prosecutor's file. As disclosed in legal proceedings many years
later, critical Brady evidence was hidden from the defense, including
evidence that strongly suggested that innocent persons had been
wrongfully prosecuted and convicted of capital murder and sentenced
to death without access to evidence that would have exonerated
them.'?
Finally, a variation <if the open file gambit that has attracted only
modest attention is the practice by some prosecutors, particularly in
corporate fraud, tax, and other white-collar crime cases, to overwhelm
the defense with massive amounts of documents, including items that
may be potential Brady evidence, and that are virtually impossible to
read and digest in the limited time available for pretrial preparation."
For example, in one of the "Enron" cases;· the prosecution's open
file policy required the defense to review over 80 million pages of
documents, without identifying potential Brady evidence. In another
financial fraud case;o the prosecution made roughly 160 boxes and
36 file cabinets of warehouse records available to the defense, without
segregating the files or identifying potential Brady evidence. To be
sure, some prosecutors provide indexes and other identifying data to
aid the defense in inspecting the material. But so long as the
prosecution has made the files available for defense inspection, the
courts do not require the prosecution to "point the defense to specific
documents within a larger mass of material that it has already turned
over.,,91
GAMBLING: PLAYING THE ODDS ON MATERIALITY

As already noted, most Brady evidence that has been suppressed
by prosecutors is never uncovered:2 The evidence remains buried
ld
The opinions in D'Ambrosio v. Bagley and State v. Larkins-eapital murder convictions
prosecuted by Marino-detail the numerous Brady violations committed by Marino. Given
these serious violations, and the many other citations to Marino's misconduct, one can only
wonder how many other "Marino prosecutions" included exculpatory evidence that Marino
concealed from the defense.
88 See Panel Discussion, supra note 65, at 800-01 (comments of Nina A.
Ginsberg)(describing problems of open file discovery in "big document cases" as
"overwhelming task," since it is "impossible to go through :file cabinets full of documents, make
any sense out ofthem, figure out what might be helpful to you").
&9 United States v. Causey, 356 F.3d 681 (SD. Tex. 2005).
90 United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005).
91 United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 94 (5th Cir. 1997).
92 See supra note 28.
86

87
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somewhere, and as one conrt noted, "may never emerge from secret
government files.,,93 Although there are many reasons why
prosecutors suppress Brady evidence, probably the most powerful
justification most often relied on is the prosecutor's unilateral
conclusion that the evidence is not material.94 This prosecutor's
calculation is not based on an estimate of whether the evidence will
be favorable, helpful, or advantageous to the defense; rather, the only
question is whether the evidence will be viewed by a conrt after the
trial has been completed as being sufficiently important that it is
"reasonably probable" that with the evidence the defendant would not
have been found guilty,9s and that without the evidence, the guilty
verdict is not "worthy of confidence.,,96 Thus, the central issue in
most of the cases in which suppressed Brady evidence is discovered
and litigated, often many years after a defendant's conviction~and
there are thousands of such cases~concems the materiality of the
suppressed evidence. And as with other issues in Brady litigation, the
lenient standard of materiality encourages prosecutorial
gamesmanship by allowing prosecutors to play and frequently beat
the odds that their suppression of evidence, even if discovered, will be
found innnaterial by a conrt.
Indeed, under the standard of materiality applied by the conrts,
gamesmanship by the unethical prosecutor is to be expected. The
rogue prosecutor who wants to "outwit and entrap [his] quarry,,97 will
almost always deliberately suppress Brady evidence, believing that it
will probably never be discovered, but even if it is discovered,
perhaps long after the conviction, it is unlikely to be found material.
Even the ethical prosecutor knows he cannot lose this game, and
following her adversarial instincts, might reasonably determine not to
disclose evidence that is obviously favorable to the defense. Consider
Professor Sundby's description, most likely imagined with tongue
lodged fmuly in cheek, of the "ethical" prosecutor thinking about a

United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3dCir. 1984).
Most of the criticism of the judiciary's application of the Brady rule centers on the issue
of materiality, and the conclusion most often reached by the courts that notwithstanding the
prosecutor's suppression of evidence favorable to the accused, the evidence was not material
and therefore no constitutional violation was committed.
95 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 ("The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.").
96 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) ("The question is not whether the defendant
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in
its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence.'').
97 Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
93

94
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particular piece of favorable evidence under Brady's materiality
standard:
This piece of evidence is so exculpatory in nature that it actually
undermines my belief that a guilty verdict would be worthy of
confidence. Under Brady, therefore, I need to turn this evidence over
to the defense. Then, once I turn the evidence over and satisty my
constitutional obligation, I can resume my zealous efforts to obtain a
guilty verdict that I have just concluded will not be worthy of
confidence:'
Prosecutors are, in case after case, increasingly "play the odds"
that their suppression of important items of evidence will be viewed
retrospectively by a reviewing court as not material and therefore not
a violation of Brady. When this type of prosecutorial gamesmanship
is exposed, courts occasionally check-mate the prosecutor, as a
federal court recently did in vacating a murder conviction arising
from a fight outside of a bar in New Rochelle, New York:' There, the
prosecutor withheld from the defense, until the trial was almost over,
another individual's confession that he stabbed the victim twice. The
prosecutor argued at a hearing that this confession was not material,
first, because it was more inculpating than exculpating, and second,
because it was patently unreliable and therefore did not need to be
disclosed. The confession was obviously material, as the federal court
concluded several years after the conviction. The court also pointed
out that it was not a prosecutor's prerogative in making a materiality
determination to evaluate the credibility of a piece of evidence, as
"[t]o allow otherwise would be to appoint the fox as henhouse
guard."lOO
BLIND MAN'S BLUFF: THE PROSECUTOR AS OSTRICH

As discussed below, a defendant's knowledge of Brady evidence
ordinarily relieves a prosecutor of her disclosure obligation. By the
same token, a prosecutor's lack of knowledge of Brady evidence also
98 Scott E. Sunby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale ofBrady v.
Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REv. 643, 653 (2002).
99 DiSimone v. Phillips, 461 F.3d 181 (2d Cit. 2006). Following remand, a federal district

court vacated the conviction and dismissed the indictment. See DiSimone v. Phillips, # 04 Civ.
3128 (CLB) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2007). See also Shawn Cohen and Bruce Golding, Conviction in
Bo/aneio Slaying Overturned, THE JOURNAL NEWS, Feb. 8, 2007, at IA.
lCO Id. at 195. See also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440 (it is "the criminal trial, as distinct from the
prosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal
accusations"); United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1996) ("It is not the role of
the prosecutor to decide that facially exculpatory evidence need not be turned over because the
prosecutor thinks the infonnation is false."). Nor may a prosecutor unilaterally conclude that
evidence is cumulative or redundant. See Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 301 (4th Cir.
2003) ("[T]he prosecution has a duty to disclose material even if it may seem redundant.").
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may relieve a prosecutor of her Brady duty. The parties' knowledge
of the evidence is the touchstone of Brady. Justice White made this
point in Giles v. Maryland: "[A]ny allegation of suppression boils
down to an assessment of what the State knows at trial in comparison
to the knowledge held by the defense."I01 Courts continue to recite
the litany that prosecutors who may lack knowledge of the existence
of Brady evidence have a constitutional and ethical duty to leam
about its existence, but prosecutors continue to invoke their own
familiar litany when a defendant requests Brady evidence: "We are
aware of our Brady obligation and will comply." However,
prosecutors are aware that if they lack knowledge of the existence of
Brady evidence, there is nothing for them to suppress-or disclose.
Thus, prosecutors can avoid complying with Brady by asserting either
that they are unaware of the existence of Brady evidence, or that any
Brady evidence, even if it exists, is not in their possession or control.
Clearly, a claim of ignorance offers a prosecutor a convenient
opportunity to engage in gamesmanship to avoid compliance with
Brady.
The prosecutor's claim of ignorance as an excuse for compliance
with Brady resembles a defendant's claim of ignorance as an excuse
to avoid criminal liability. With respect to criminal defendants,
ignorance or mistake may excuse criminal liability if it eliminates the
mental state necessary for the crime. 102 However, a defendant's claim
of ignorance is rejected when the defendant deliberately avoids
knowledge. 103 Or, using the so-called "Ostrich instruction,,,lo4 a judge
typically advises a jury that a defendant may not avoid guilty
knowledge by "shut[ting] his eyes for fear that he would learn,,,los or
"bury[ing] his head in the sand so that [he] will not see or hear bad
things."lo6 Should a prosecutor who claims ignorance of Brady
evidence as an excuse for non-compliance be held to a less
demanding standard?107 Indeed, if a prosecutor believes that there is a
386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967) (White, J., concurring).
WAYNER. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1, at 432 (3d ed. 2000).
103 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE (proposed Official Draft 1962) ("When knowledge of
the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a
101

102 See

person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not
exist.").
104 See Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens
Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 223-27 (1990).
105 United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane).
United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990).
see David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 ClEo. L.J. 957, 976 (1999) ("in legal
ethics, unlike criminal law, there is no willful blindness doctrine."). However, there is a huge
distinction between a private lawyer failing ''to press her client for knowledge or to corroborate
what her client tells her," Id., and a public prosecutor failing to press the police for knowledge
or to corroborate what the defense counsel tells her. See supra notes 5-8, and accompanying
106

101 But
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high probability Brady evidence exists and deliberately chooses to be
indifferent to finding it, it would not seem unreasonable to charge a
prosecutor with constructive knowledge of its existence. This
conclusion would, in turn, render the prosecutor's nondisclosure a
suppression of Brady evidence.
A prosecutor's ability to claim ignorance of Brady evidence as a
basis for non-disclosure affords "a prosecutor a considerable
opportunity for gamesmanship. To be sure, under the Supreme
Court's evolving standards governing a prosecutor's Brady duty, a
prosecutor may not successfully claim ignorance if the evidence
actually contained in the prosecutor's own files, the files of police
agencies involved in the investigation, and the files of other
investigative agencies that are part of the "prosecution team.,,108 As
the Court has noted, these are contexts in which a prosecutor, even if
he lacks actual knowledge of the evidence, "should have known" of
the evidence,109 or, as elaborated in Kyles v. Whitley, "has a duty to
learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police.,,110
But the extent of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady evidence
in places where a prosecutor is charged with constructive knowledge
has not been carefully analyzed or explained. The reasoning tends to
be ad hoc, and often concludes with a finding that the evidence is not
material in any event and therefore the prosecutor's non-compliance
does not violate Brady.11l But, again, a prosecutor is well aware that if

text.

ee United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) C'if a team or joint

108S

investigation did exist here, or if any state agent was acting on behalf of the federal government,

the federal prosecution may be charged with the knowledge of the state Attorney General's
Office").
lO9United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). See also Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) ("The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for
the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed for these purposes, to the
Government.").
110 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. However, there is no correlative duty on the part of the police to
impart such information to the prosecutor. See Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am:"
Lying and the Omission ofExculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 N. ENG. L. REv. 1, 53

(1993) (claiming that police operate independently of prosecutors, answer to different
constituencies, and may not reveal to prosecutors exculpatory evidence). See also Stanley Z.
Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons
From England, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1379 (2000) (proposing amendments to ethics codes to
require prosecutors to learn of exculpatory evidence known to police and to provide guidance on
implementing responsibility).
Hi But see United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (App. D.C. 1992) ("the courts'
willingness to insist on an affirmative duty of inquiry may stem primarily from a sense that an
inaccurate conviction based on government failure to tum over an easily turned rock is
essentially as offensive as one based on government non-disclosure"); United States v. Auten,
632 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1980) ("if disclosure were excused in instances where the
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he chooses to remain ignorant of evidence located in the files of
another agency, or fails to aggressively look for it, he will only be
held accountable for non-compliance with Brady if the evidence is
eventually is discovered, is deemed to have been in the prosecutor's
possession or control, and is found to be material. Accordingly, a
prosecutor who seeks to game the system in this way will almost
always choose to avoid knowledge and assume· the risk-an
extremely safe risk-that he will never be held accountable. I 12
A prosecutor's deliberate blinduess is most commonly encountered
with respect to specific types of witnesses-scientific experts,
cooperating witnesses, and eyewitnesses. A prosecutor's failure to
carefully scrutinize the accuracy and credibility of scientific experts,
and to search for evidence that would demonstrate the axpert is
fabricating or mistaken has been one of the recognized causes of
wrongful convictionsy3 Indeed, scientific evidence, because it is so
technical and complex, and has a unique capacity to persuade juries,
requires close scrutiny by a responsible prosecutor. I 14 Discovery rules
require prosecutors to disclose results, reports, and statements by
scientific experts the prosecutor intends to use at trial, in order to
allow the defense sufficient time to analyze the scientific infonnation,
to conduct independent tests of their own, and to prepare their own
experts. llS
There are many instances, however, of a prosecutor's failure to
disclose evidence showing that the testimony of the
prosecutor'sscientific expert was either false or misleading. ll6 There

prosecution has not sought out information readily available to it, we would be inviting and
placing a premium on conduct unworthy of representatives of the government. "); In re Brown,
952 P.2d 715, 721 (CaL 1998) ("Here, as in most circumstances, Brady compliance demanded
no more than simple 3dvertence. The evidence was readily accessible to the prosecution.").
Il2 See Mary Prosser, Refonning Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to
New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 541, 568 ("Some prosecutors remain willing to take their
chances that the evidence will never come to light or, if unearthed, will result in no significant
penalty to the prosecution.").
113 See JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000), at
158-171.
li4See United States v. Amaral" 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (expert usually
viewed by jury with an "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness").
115 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C) and (D); ABA STANDARDS FOR JUSTICE; DISCOVERY
AND TRIAL By JURY § 11-2.l(iv) ffild (v)(3d ed. 1996).
116See Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA.
CITY U. f.. REv. 17, 21-8 (2003). In a recent murder case exoneration from upstate New York,
the prosecutor suppressed a report from the nation's leading odontologist that "excluded" the
defendant for causing a bite mark on the victim's arm, and used the testimony of a local dentist
to convict the defendant, who spent 15 years in prison until freed by DNA evidence. See
Fernanda Santos, With DNA From Exhumed Body, .Man Finally Wins Freedom, N.Y. nMES,
Jan. 24, 2007, atB5.
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are many instances involving a prosecutor's incomplete, untimely or
total failure to comply with discovery obligations. lI7 Moreover, there
are other disturbing examples of prosecutors who appear to be
ignorant of their expert's dishonest and incompetent analysis, as well
as the expert's use of so-called 'Junk testimony," notwithstanding
obvious signs'of pervasive and systematic fraud, incompetence, and
misconduct by the expert. l18 Indeed, in order to obtain the benefits of
their expert's testimony, prosecutors have deliberately ignored and
concealed complaints of misconduct, and have publicly praised and
rewarded the work of some of the most notorious of these so-called
"experts.,,119

Prosecutors also avoid knowledge about w.eaknesses in the
testimony of cooperating witnesses deliberately, as well as the
existence of Brady evidence that might discredit the testimony of
cooperators. Professor Yaroshefsky' s important study of cooperating
witnesses,120 based on extensive interviews with former federal
prosecutors, describes the extent to which prosecutors succumb to the
allure and manipulation of the cooperator. One former prosecutor
described the relationship as "falling in love with your rat,,,I21 which
not only skews the prosecutor's ability to evaluate the cooperator's
credibility objectively, but inhibits the prosecutor from searching for
evidence that might discredit the witness. Such a mindset
intentionally avoids probing into obvious fabrications and
embellishments by the cooperating witnesses,122 of searching for
corroboration that would reasonably support the witness's story,123
not inquiring about prior statements cooperators may have made to
police investigators,124 and accepting unhesitatingly the case agent's
111Id.

Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need
for Independent crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 439 (1997) (documenting
accounts of widespread abuses by forensic scientific experts).
119 See Gershman, supra note 117, at 27, 31.
120 See Yaroshefsky, supra note 77.
121Id at 944.
1211d. at 946-47 ("additional probing makes the case more complicated and sometimes
more difficult to prevail so people ignore such facts"; "cooperator's testimony was so important
to a case that the evaluation of his veracity was skewed through the lens of his utility to the
government"; "the pressures and mindset of some prosecutors make· it less likely that the
government will carefully examine lies by its cooperators").
123 ld. at 936, 938, 940 C'the black hole of corroboration is the time that cooperators and
agents spend alone"; "some prosecutors become 'lazy and sloppy' in obtaining and evaluating
corroboration"; "there were numerous instances where facts were not uncovered due to lack of
investigation").
124Id. at 945-6, 958, 961 ("many people do not want to uncover facts that are inconsistent
with their theory of the case"; "embellished testimony is the 'dirty little secret' of our system";
"the office lore is don't take too many notes or figure out how to take notes so that they are
meaningful to you and no one else").
'tiS See
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opinions and recommendations about the credibility and accuracy of
the witness. 125
.
Thus, the ostrich-prosecutor, as Professor Yaroshefsky's stndy
reveals, has an unduly simplistic attitnde about the truth, an
"obsession with exact facts," and is a poor intuitive judge of truth and
deception. l26 By the same token, several commentators have
described a prosecutorial mindset that embodies a kind of ''machoostrich," characterized by a hardened view of justice, 127 an emphasis
on putting bad people in jail,l28 and a "tunnel vision'; approach to
ascertaining the truth and the credibility of their witnesses. l29 This
mindset, needless to say, makes it much less likely that a prosecutor
will search for Brady evidence, and appreciate its value even if he
finds it.
'.
Prosecutors also are willfully blind to the unreliability of
eyewitnesses. Given the many DNA exonerations, mostly attributable
to erroneous eyewitness testimony, it is reasonable to expect that a
prosecutor seeking to promote justice would carefully probe the
accuracy of the eyewitness and search for any discrediting evidence.
In fact, prosecutors are probably more adept than juries in evaluating
the reliability of their eyewitnesses. l3O Prosecutors know more about
the case, about the techniques of interviewing witnesses, and
presumably are aware of the inherent dangers of eyewitness
testimony. Nevertheless, cases are replete with examples of
eyewitness testimony whose reliability defies logic, and whose
testimony would seem unbelievable even to the most naive and
1251d. at 945 ("The relationship between the prosecutor and the agent who investigated the
case has also resulted in assistants acting in a less than diligent fashion"; "if you are committed
to getting the absolute truth, you often have tension with various agencies").
1261d at 953-:-6 (''there is a perception that many assistants do not share the complex view
of the nature of truth"; "there's often a linear attitude about the truth;" ''prosecutors simply do
not understand how memory works and the reality of truth"; "danger of imposing a lawyer's
view of fact development upon a cooperator who does not share a lawyer's 'obsession with
exact facts"').
127 See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REv. 98, 109
(1975) (prosecutor's "working environment caus[es] him to view his job in tenns of convictions
rather than the broader aclllevement of justice"); Yaroshefsky, supra note 77, at 949 (describing
prosecutors as having "law enforcement," "gung ho," and ''true believer" mentality).
128 See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL.
550,552 (1987) (''the prosecutor will almost always believe the defendant to be guilty").
129 See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49
How. LJ. 475 (2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions o/Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wrs. L. REv. 291; Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial
Deeision Making: Some Lessons o/Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARy L. REv. 1587 (2006).
130 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Loss 0/ Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of
Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 446 (1987) ("There is every reason to believe that prosecutors,
with more information at their disposal and more experience, are considerably better than juries
at judging identification in criminal cases.").
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inexperienced prosecutor. l3l For prosecutors to blindly accept the
testimony of these witnesses because they appear to be confident, and
refuse to engage in even the most superficial investigation of their
background and reliability, makes it much more likely that innocent
persons will be convicted. 132
A prosecutor is also willfully blind to, the existence of Brady
evidence in places where a prosecutor is not deemed to have
constructive koowledge, but where a search might reasonably yield
exculpatory evidence. If Brady evidence is in the possession of a
government agency that is not a part of the investigation or the
"prosecution team," a prosecutor's Brady duty generally is limited to
instances in which a prosecutor actually koows about the evidence. 133
Thus, even though it might be reasonable for a prosecutor to believe
that Brady evidence exists, and even though the failure to search for it
might encourage the perception that prosecutors willfully overlook or
avoid their Brady obligations, prosecutors ordinarily do not search for
such evidence. 13' Prosecutors claim that it would be an onerous
burden to engage in an open-ended "fishing expedition," particularly
given a prosecutor's heavy workload, daily crises, and trial
preparation. 135 Prosecutors also claim that such evidence is available
to the defense through a discovery request or a subpoena. Finally,
prosecutors are aware that even if the evidence ultimately is
discovered, the prosecutor will not be found to have suppressed the
evidence because the evidence was not in the prosecutor's possession
or control but, rather, was in the possession and control of an
independent agency.l36 However, if a prosecutor is faced with a
specific request for Brady evidence and koows or should koow that
the evidenGe exists, he cannot bury his head in the sand.
13l See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Tntth, 14 OED. J. LEGAL ETHICS
309,343 n. 191 (2001) (studies documenting unreliability of eyewitness identifications).
132 The growing number of DNA exonerations is probably the most powerful indicator of
the questionable reliability of eyewitness identifications.
133 But see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57"-.60 (1987) (suggesting that Brady
may impose a duty on prosecutors to examine files of other government agencies to detennine if
they contain exculpatory evidence); Lavallee v. Coplan, 374 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting
"ambiguity about the relation~hip between Ritchie and Brady); Crivens v.Roth, 172 F.3d 991,
997 (7th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor required to conduct "diligent search" for evidence in possession
of "some arm of the state").
134 See Robert Hochman, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials,
63 U. CHI. L REv. 1673, 1687 (1996) ("Brady does not impose a general duty on the
government to investigate.").
135 See United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) ("prosecutors are not
required to undertake a 'fishing expedition' in other jurisdictions to discover impeachment
evidence. '). See a/so ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 83.
136 See United States v. PeluIlo, 399 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (prosecutor not charged
with knowledge of relevant document in possession of federal welfare benefits agency that was
not part of "prosecution team").

2007]

LITIGATING BRADY V. MARYLAND

557

HIDE AND SEEK

. A prosecutor also may avoid Brady disclosure by claiming that the
defense knew of the existence of the evidence, or with reasonable
diligence could have obtained the evidence. The Brady rule, as
described in United States v. Agurs, applies to situations "[involving]
the discovery, after trial, of evidence which had been known to the
prosecution but unknown to the defense.,,137 This description appears
to focus on a defendant's actual knowledge of the evidence in
determining whether evidence is available to a defendant for Brady
purposes. B' To pennit a defendant who has actual knowledge of the
existence of suppressed evidence later to claim a Brady violation
based on the prosecutor's nondisclosure would enable a .defendant to
sandbag the prosecutor. Such a tactic, one court observed, "would
allow [a defendant] to take a free ride during the trial and if he is not
satisfied with the result he can always get a new trial."B9 In addition,
a rule of disclosure that focuses on a defendant's actual knowledge
strikes an appropriate adversarial balance that places reasonable
obligations on a defendant and enforces a prosecutor's duty to seek
justice.
However, courts have amplified this "exception" to a prosecutor's
suppression of Brady evidence not just in situations where the
defendant has actual knowledge of the Brady evidence, but also in
situations where the defense could have been expected to discover the
evidence through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 14o And the
extension of the principle of defense knowledge has offered
prosecutors another opportunity to engage in gamesmanship-i.e., to
conceal important evidence that theoretically may be available to' a
defendant-and argue later, if the evidence ever comes to light, that
the defendant, despite having no actual knowledge of the evidence,
could easily haye discovered the evidence with the exercise of
reasonable diligence. The consequences of this gamesmanship are
several. First, by shifting the focus away from his own duty to
disclose hidden evidence to the defendant's duty to find it,
prosecutors bring disrepute to themselves and disrespect for the

m427 u.s. 97, 103 (1976).
Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2001) (the description in Agurs
"suggests a focus of actual knowledge as the key consideration in detennining whether evidence
is available to the defense for Brady purposes.").
139 Smith v. State, 541 S.W.2d 831, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
J40See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Crr. 1982) ("Evidence is not
suppressed if the defendant either knew, or should have known, of the essential facts pennitting
him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence.").
138See
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system of justice.!4! Moreover, resolving questions of whether a
defendant could have learned about the evidence with reasonable
diligence requires courts to engage in difficult post hoc factual
determinations of the extent to which evidence was available to a
defendant, and whether the defendant reasonably should have known
about it.
To be sure, where Brady evidence- is readily accessible to a
defendant by exercising reasonable diligence, it makes sense not to
impose a search and disclose obligation on the prosecutor. Examples
might include evidence contained in an open file that has been
furnished to the defense; items that a defendant reasonably should
know are contained in a public record and may be obiained through
routine discovery or service of a subpoena;!42 or conversations
between a' defendant and other persons which the defendant
reasonably should recall. However, although a prosecutor might be
able to avoid disclosure by claiming that a defendant should have
been aware of pertinent statements that he made to other persons, it is
not reasonable for a prosecutor, as one court observed, "to hold a
defendant accountable for every conversation he has ever had in his
lifetime regardless of the surrounding or intervening
circumstances.,,!43 Or, as another court put it, "it is untenable to
suggest that, in order to obtain impeachment evidence on behalf of a
client, a public defender is, in any way, obligated to check the total
list of persons who have been served by the agency to ascertain
whether a prospective witness was a former client."l44
Moreover, since a defense attorney has the power to subpoena
public records, a court may find that the attorney's failure to attempt
to obtain a public document that is available and accessible exempts
the prosecutor from non-compliance with Brady. However, merely
because evidence theoretically may be available to a defendant does
not necessarily mean that it is available for purposes of determining
whether Brady applies. For example, a prosecutor's nondisclosure of
an affidavit of a key government witness filed in court prior to her
guilty plea is theoretically available to the defense by the simple
expedient of requesting the information or serving a subpoena for the
record. However, the failure of the prosecutor to disclose the affidavit
141

See Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2001) (prosecutor's "untenable"

and "expansive" view of what evidence is available to the defense skews the "careful balance
between maintaining an adversarial system ofjustice and enforcing the prosecution's obligation
to seek justice before victory" and "would punish the defense for not obtaining evidence it had
no reason to believe existed.").
142 United States v. Barham, 595 F.ld 231 (5th Cit. 1979).
143 Schledwitz v.United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1013 (6th Cit. 1999).
144

United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.ld 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1991).
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would constitute prosecutorial suppression of evidence if the defense
had no reason to know of the existence of the public record. 145
Moreover, a defendant may have even less reason to know of the
existence of the record if the prosecutor has already produced a large
volume of other materials concerning the witness, including
numerous publicly-available court documents and thereby may have
lulled the defense into believing that they had received every
pertinent item. 146
.
Finally, the willingness of courts to accept a prosecutor's claim of
defense knowledge as a way of excusing a Brady nondisclosure
encourages further gamesmanship. For example, in DiSimone v.
Phillips,l47 a murder case, the prosecutor concealed a statement from
a third person admitting to having stabbed the deceased. The defense
made three separate requests for Brady evidence, including a specific
request for evidence that someone other than the defendant stabbed
the victim. The prosecutor responded that no such evidence existed,
and that the defense was engaging in a "fishing expedition."I48 When
it was discovered that such a statement existed, and that the
prosecutor had not disclosed it, the prosecutor argned that the defense
knew about the statement by virtue of the specificity of its request. 149
Given that the defendant was on trial for a murder, had specifically
asked for any statement of third-party culpability, and was deceived
by the prosecutor into believe that no statement existed, it would not
have been unreasonable for the prosecutor to represent to the trial
court that such a statement existed but that it had no duty of
disclosure in view of the fact that the defense probably knew about
the statement. Moreover, it is patently unreasonable to suggest, as the
prosecutor argned post-trial, that the defense was being disingenuous
and was trying to sandbag the prosecutor. The prosecutor's conduct in
DiSimone aptly illustrates one court's observation of Brady litigation:
"[T]he game will go on, but justice will suffer."l5O
145 United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200 (2d Crr. 1995) (defense had no reason to know
that government witness's affidavit.had been filed in court prior to her guilty plea); United
States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929 (4th"CiT. 1994) (public record not reasonably available to defense
when document not filed until day on which defense rested its case).
146 United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d at 1209) ("A defendant receiving such documents from
the government could reasonably assume that the court files did not include other undisclosed
exculpatory and impeachment documents").
I " 461 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2006).
148Id. at 193.
1491d. at 197. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the defendant or his attorney knew of the undisclosed Brady evidence. On remand, the
district court rejected the contention and based on the Brady violation vacated the conviction
and dismissed the indictment.
150 United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 1984).
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DELAY AND CONQUER

Prosecutors in possession of Brady evidence who are inclined to
disclose the evidence have a powerful incentive to delay the
disclosure as long as possible. Prosecutors know that the judiciary's
treatment of "suppression" does not require a prosecutor to make pretrial disclosure, and thus allows a prosecutor considerable latitude to
withhold the evidence prior to tria1."! Indeed, courts generally review
delayed disclosure to determine whether the defendant had a
meaningful opportunity to make effective use of the evidence at trial
in order to cross-examination prosecution witnesses and present the
defense case.!S2 Ethics codes require "timely disclosure," but do not
explicitly require pre-trial disclosure. 153 Moreover, prosecutors are
well aware that continuing to withhold favorable evidence may
enhance the opportunity for a guilty plea and may also impair a
defendant's pre-trial preparation. Thus, the timing of Brady disclosure
provides a prosecutor with another opportunity to engage in litigation
gamesmanship.
Prosecutors usually are aware of the existence of Brady evidence
well before the date of tria1. Moreover, an experienced prosecutor
reasonably should know that some evidence is inherently Brady
evidence (i.e., promises to witnesses, eyewitnesses who have
identified a different person, a confession by a person other than the
defendant, and scientific evidence that casts doubt on the
prosecution's theory of the case). Furthermore, even if a prosecutor
does not appreciate the significance to the accused of the evidence, a
prosecutor who receives a specific defense request for Brady evidence
in advance of trial that identifies the nature of the evidence sought is
obviously alerted to the evidence and can make an informed decision
on whether to disclose it. Assuming that a prosecutor is aware of the
significance of the evidence to the defense, and that for different
reasons it must be disclosed, a prosecutor strategically may wait as
long as she can until the trial actually commences before making the
disclosure.
15l See Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 100 (2d CiT. 2000 ("Disclosure prior to trial is not
mandated.").

152Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 532 n 10 (11th Cir. 1985) ("In some instances
[disclosure of Brady material during trial] may be sufficient. However . . . some [Brady]
material must be disclosed earlier. This is because of the importance of some infOlmation to

adequate trial preparation.").
153See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, R. 3.8(d) (requiring prosecutor to make "timely
disclosure"); MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 7-103 (B) (requiring timely disclosure); ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 2, Standard 3"3.11(a) (requiring disclosure "at the earliest feasible
opportunity").
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Most often a prosecutor's gamesmanship in delaying the
disclosure will be successful because of the wide latitude afforded by
the courts, particularly where the defense does not seek a continuance
after receiving the evidence. There are risks, however, in this type of
gamesmanship. Depending on the circumstances, belated disclosures
may be found by a reviewing court to be the equivalent of
suppression, especially if the court appreciates the harm that belated
disclosures may inflict not only on the ability of a defendant to
receive a fair trial but also on the defendant's ability to effectively
prepare for tria!' An example of prosecutorial gamesmanship in
delaying disclosure of critical exculpatory evidence is Leka v.
Portuondo,l54 in which the Second Circuit Court of Appe~~s found
that the state prosecutor violated Brady, notwithstanding that the
evidence was disclosed 3 days before the tria!. In Leka, a murder case,
two prosecution eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the shooter.
Three other eyewitnesses, however, gave statements to the police that
undermined the prosecution's theory, and one of these witnesses, an
off-duty police officer, gave an account that essentially destroyed the
prosecution's case. ISS The defense made a request for Brady evidence
twenty-two months before tria!.1S6 During plea negotiations, the
prosecutor told the defendant, falsely, that an off-duty police officer
was a key witness who observed the shooting and could identify the
defendant. lS ? And when the defense first learned of the officer's
identity at a hearing 3 days before trial, "the prosecution pressed its
advantages to extend the delay" by taking successful steps to prevent
the defense from interviewing this witness. ISS
The court found that the prosecutor's belated disclosure was "too
little, too late."!S9 While recognizing that pre-trial disclosure is not
mandated, t1}e court observed that the longer a prosecutor withholds
evidence, and the closer to trial the disclosure is made, the less
opportunity there is for effective use. 160 The court was sensitive to the
harm to a defendant from delayed disclosure--i.e., the need to divert
scare resources from more pressing initiatives and the inability to
assimilate the new information into its case and throw exiting
strategies into disarray.!6! ''The opportunity for use under Brady," the
court concluded, "is the opportunity for a responsible lawyer to use
154 257

F.3d 89.
92-93, 98.
156 Idat 93.
157 Id.
158!d. at 102.
159Id. at 100.
160 Leka, 257 F.3d at 101.
155Id. at

1611d.
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the information with some degree of calculation and forethought "i62
Leka is one of a handful of cases in which the prosecutor's

gamesmanship backfired.
OBST;,\CLE COURSES, MAzES, AND SIMON SEZ

Prosecutorial resistance to post-convic!ion claims of innocence has
been amply documented by courts and"commentators. i63 The reasons
for such resistance are not always clear or consistent, but in a test of a
prosecutor's commitment to serving justice instead of victory, many
prosecutors will fail. Prosecutorial resistance to persuasive claims of
innocence finds an interesting parallel in prosecutorjal resistance to
post-conviction claims that Brady evidence has been wrongfully
suppressed. Even in the most egregious instances of a prosecutor's
unconstitutional and unethical suppression of Brady evidence,
prosecutors, rather than acknowledging the misconduct and the
resulting failure to accord the defendant a fair trial, often raise an
obstacle course of hoops that a defendant must overcome before
successfully litigating his meritorious Brady claim. This prosecutorial
conduct is even more brazen in the way it reinforces the prosecutor's
earlier misconduct in falsely and misleadingly representing to the
court and defendant that no Brady evidence exists.
Thus, prosecutors have argued that notwithstanding the
nondisclosure of Brady evidence, the defendant should be
procedurally barred from litigating the Brady claim in a postconviction proceeding in federal court because he did not exhaust his
Brady claim by failing to submit the claim initially to a state COurt. i64
This argument assumes, of course, that the defendant was aware of
the pertinent facts when he litigated his claim in the state court, and
deliberately chose not to raise the Brady issue. However, if a
prosecutor's conceahnent of Brady evidence was not known by the
defendant during the state court proceedings, it would be
disingenuous for a prosecutor to make such an argument. Indeed, as
federal courts have consistently noted in rejecting such a prosecutorial
gambit, "[w]e will not penalize [a defendant] for presenting an issue
162Id at 103.
See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125 (2004); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
Prosecutorial Misconduct and WrongfUl Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System,
2006 WiS. L. REv. 399.
164Banks, 540 U.S. at 690. See Crivens v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Crivens failure to raise claim in state courts "resulted not from his own lack of attention or
other fault, but rather because the state did not provide the [previously suppressed Brady
163

evidence] until after the habeas petition was filed.").
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to us that he was unable to present to the state courts because of the
state's misconduct."l65
Prosecutors similarly resist a defendant's post-conviction Brady
claim by arguing that the defendant has not shown sufficient cause
why he did not develop the claim in state court proceedings. I66 Once
again, a defendant shows cause for his failure to develop the facts in a
state court proceeding where the prosecutor's suppression of Brady
evidence was the reason for the defendant's failure to raise the
claim. 167 Thus, where the prosecution concealed Brady evidence from
the defendant at his trial, and misleadingly represented that it had
complied with Brady disclosure obligations, a defendant may
demonstrate cause for failing to investigate the p,~osecutor's
nondisclosure in state post-conviction proceedings. As the Supreme
Court observed in Banks v. Dretke: "Our decisions lend no support to
the notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of undisclosed
Brady material when the prosecution represents that all such material
has been disciosed."I6"
Moreover, prosecutors typically respond to a post-conviction
Brady claim by arguing that even if a defendant has exhausted his
claim in the state court, or notwithstanding sufficient cause for his
failure to develop the facts in the state court, the defendant was not
prejudiced by the prosecutor's nondisclosure. This claim dovetails
with the requirement that in order to establish a Brady violation, a
defendant must demonstrate that the evidence was material to guilt or
punishment. A prosecutor's attempt to defeat a post-conviction Brady
claim by arguing lack of prejudice simply duplicates the prosecutor's
gamesmanship in concealing the evidence from the defendant in the
first place. Interestingly, when Brady evidence is discovered post-trial
and is the subject of the litigation, we often are able to discern from
the prosecutor's argument that the evidence is not material to how the
prosecutor gambled and "play[ed] the odds" originally in denying the
defendant a fair trial. I69
Finally, some prosecutors inject other procedural obstacles to a
defendant's presumably meritorious post-conviction Brady claim, i.e.,
"You didn't say Simon Sez." Thus, prosecutors argue that the
Crivens, 172 F.3d at 995.
540 U.S. at 691-96.
167 See, e.g., Banks, 540 U.S. at 692; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289; Crivens, 172 F.3d at 995-165

166 Banks,

96.
540 U.S. at 695.
See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Brady materiality standard
"invites a prosecutor to gamble, to play the odds, and to take a chance that the evidence will
later turn out not to have been potentially dispositive. ''). For an interesting example of this type
of gamesmanship, see DiSimone v. Phillips, 461 F.3d 181.
168

169
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defendant did not use the correct nomenclature to describe the
nondisclosure violation, i.e., that a Brady claim must be pleaded
separately from a Giglio claim,170 or that a defendant did not move to
arnend his petition after he learned during the post-conviction hearing
the nature and extent of the prosecutor's violation. l7l And, to
compound this· gamesmanship to protect an unconstitutional
conviction, some prosecutors in their arguments to an appellate court,
even to the Supreme Court, continue to play word games by claiming,
falsely, that they said things in the lower court that they did not say,
and did not say certain things that they did say.172
AFTERTIIOUGHTS

Prosecutorial gamesmanship in litigating Brady v. Maryland
should come as no surprise. To a prosecutor, having to disclose
exculpatory evidence to a defendant whom the prosecutor believes is
gUilty and which may enable that defendant to defeat the ends of
justice is intolerable. Moreover, given a prosecutor's enormous
discretion over Brady disclosure, the broad and malleable rules within
which to exercise that discretion, and the likelihood that suppressed
evidence will never be found, it is almost certain that prosecutors will
routinely avoid compliance with Brady. To the extent that the
literature finds pithy ways to catalogue prosecutors: "virtuOUS,"173
"prudent,,,174 "good,,,175 "neutral,,,176 "ethical,,,177 "unique,,,178
no See Banks, 540 U.S. at 690, ll. 11 (Court does not reach prosecutor's argument that
Brady claim is distinct from a Giglio claim and must be pleaded separately because Banks
qualifies forreliefunder Brady).
J71 Id. at 687 (prosecutor argued that when new and previously unknown Brady evidence
came to light, Banks should have moved to amend or supplement his earlier petition that raised
a differept Brady claim, notwithstanding the prosecutor's failure to object to the new argument
when it was made originally and by failing to object, impliedly consented pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15[b] to Banks' new claim).
J72See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, 16, Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (No.
02-8286) (lawyer for the state, Gena Bonn, falsely denies that a key government witness was an
informant and in response to a question from the Court: "So the prosecution can lie and conceal
and the prisoner still has the burden to-to discover the evidence? That's your position?" Ms.
Bonn responded, "Yes, Your Honor.").
173'See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search ofthe Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework,
15 AM. J. CRlM. L. 197 (1988).
174 See Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259 (2001).
175 See Janet C Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets
Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1133 (2005); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a
Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL EnlIcs 355 (2001).
176 See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1695 (2000).
177 See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL.
550 (1987).
178 See Fred C. Zacharias & BruceA. Green, The Uniqueness ofFederal Prosecutors, 88
GEO. L.J. 207 (2000).
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"minister of jnstice"l79-I would add "gamesman" to the list to
denote an official who revels in the combat of the courtroom, the
"wide world oflitigation"-and the sheer thrill of playing games with
the evidence. And there is probably no greater thrill than to play
games with the rules of discovery generally, and especially the
disclosure rule of Brady v. Maryland, in order to thwart a defendant's
ability to win, because the odds of not getting caught are stacked so
heavily in the prosecutor's favor.
I have attempted to use the metaphor of games to describe the
prosecutor's litigation tactics with respect to Brady disclosures. The
schemes, tactics, and outright games are sometimes extreme in their
brazenness. Occasionally, even a ghoulish quality.. emerges,
particularly in those cases in which a prosecutor's nondisclosure has
sent an innocent man to the death chamber. Moreover, since there is
virtually no accountability, liability, or punishment for Brady
violations, prosecutors are encouraged to play the game with
impunity. We are told by commentators that education, ISO selfawareness ,181 financial incentives 182 increased "transparency,"l8J an.d
an appreciation of their own "moral superiority,,,l84 may make
prosecutors more inclined to behave ethically. However, given the
stark reality that emerges from studying the Brady cases, it is much
more rational to conclude that prosecutors most often think about
games to avoid compliance with Brady, because there is nothing
tangible to stop them.
"

119 See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, R. 3.8, comment a (prosecutor has responsibility of "a
minister ofjustice").
•
180 See Kenneth Bresler, "] Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score oj
Criminal ConVictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 537, 546 (1996).•
181 See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "SeekJustice?", 26 FORDHAM liRE. L.J.
607,642 (1999) ("it may take a certain amount of inner strength (or strength of character) for an
individual prosecutor ... to comply with procedural nonns'').
182 See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAML. REv. 851 (1995).
183 See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 237.
184 See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55
VAND. L. REv. 381, 450 (2002) (arguing that federal prosecutors have a "sense of moral
superiority" and resist efforts to regulate their behavior because they "care about ethics issues
and do not misbehave").

